The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) has uncovered an emerging network allegedly exploiting crowdfunding platforms, proxy bank accounts and telephone lines linked to deceased persons to raise and move funds for terrorist activities.
The findings are contained in the agency’s 2025 Annual Report, which examined evolving patterns in terrorist financing, fraud and other financial crimes across Nigeria.
According to the NFIU, foreign-based facilitators are increasingly using social media campaigns disguised as humanitarian or educational interventions to solicit donations from sympathisers.
The agency said links to payment platforms and conventional bank accounts are circulated through encrypted messaging applications, including Telegram and Signal, allowing hundreds of individuals to make relatively small donations, often ranging from $50 to $500.
The report noted that the relatively low-value transactions are structured to reduce the chances of triggering automated anti-money laundering alerts.
Funds raised through the network are subsequently consolidated in a central or “master account” controlled by a senior member of the group who is legally resident outside Nigeria.
Once the funds reach a predetermined level, the money is broken into multiple smaller transfers and routed through International Money Transfer Operators and remittance applications to suspected money mules in Nigeria.
The NFIU said students, small-business owners and relatives could be used as intermediaries, helping to obscure the source and eventual destination of the funds.
Recipients may then convert the money into cash, acquire items such as motorcycles, fertiliser and satellite internet equipment, or move the funds through mobile banking channels to logistics coordinators and field operatives.
The agency described the process as a critical stage in integrating illicit funds into terrorist operations.
The report also identified the use of women’s bank accounts as proxies for suspected terrorist financiers.
According to the NFIU, accounts may be opened in the names of wives, sisters or female associates but secretly controlled by male commanders or logistics managers.
In some cases, the men retain access to ATM cards, mobile banking credentials and PINs, effectively distancing the actual operators from the movement of illicit funds.
Another method involves the use of telephone numbers that are not registered to the actual account holders or beneficiaries.
The NFIU said facilitators may rely on pre-registered SIM cards, numbers linked to deceased persons or SIMs registered in the names of third parties to weaken the connection between bank accounts, telephone lines and Bank Verification Numbers.
The practice, it said, can frustrate investigations by directing authorities to individuals who have no direct connection to the actual facilitators.
The report further highlighted financial techniques allegedly used by terrorist cells, including those linked to the Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP.
According to the agency, some networks use detailed and professional-sounding transaction narrations to maintain internal financial records, creating what investigators described as a structured accounting system for tracking operational expenses.
Analysts observed repeated logistics-related payments from single sources to multiple recipients, suggesting a coordinated financial management structure within the networks.
However, other facilitators reportedly use coded words, innocent-looking descriptions and alphanumeric combinations to conceal the true purpose of transactions.
The NFIU said some operators also switch between languages in an apparent effort to evade automated bank monitoring systems designed to flag suspicious keywords.
Beyond terrorism financing, the report identified fraud as one of the most significant financial crime threats recorded during the period.
The agency cited growing concerns over Ponzi schemes, fraudulent crowdfunding operations, cryptocurrency-enabled investment scams and hacking-related fraud involving compromised social media and messaging accounts.
It said criminals were also exploiting weaknesses in fintech onboarding systems, particularly accounts with minimal identification requirements, while digital platforms were being used to recruit victims and move funds more quickly.
The NFIU also raised concerns over persistent vulnerabilities in the management of public funds, including the diversion of state and local government resources through accounts belonging to finance officers and associated third parties.
Procurement processes and the continued reliance on cash transactions were also identified as major risk areas, with both complicating efforts to establish audit trails and trace illicit assets.
The financial intelligence agency said it had converted its findings into targeted advisories, executive alerts and strategic intelligence products to support law enforcement agencies, financial institutions and policymakers in responding to the evolving threats.
